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THE CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE CODE AND 
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
AILLA WASSTROM-WELZ 
 
Connecticut enacted its first formal evidence code in 2000.  Initially, 
the rules set forth in the evidence code were understood as binding and not 
subject to appellate court revision.  However, in State v. DeJesus, a 2008 
Connecticut Supreme Court decision, the court held otherwise.  The 
DeJesus court interpreted the plain language and history of the code as not 
intending to bind the appellate courts.  The plurality went on, in dicta, to 
conclude that such a holding was necessary to preserve the 
constitutionality of the code.  The plurality asserted that the superior court 
judges, in their rulemaking capacity as delegated to them by the 
legislature, lack the constitutional authority to bind the appellate courts to 
such a code.  This decision is one of several in a line of Connecticut cases 
raising the question of the extent to which the legislative and judicial 
branches exert control over state judicial procedure.  This Note discusses 
the four opinions issued in State v. DeJesus and examines the ongoing 
constitutional questions surrounding the separation of powers between 
these branches and the newly raised question as to the separation of 
powers within the judicial branch itself. 
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THE CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE CODE AND 
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS  
AILLA WASSTROM-WELZ* 
It is one of the great legacies of the framers of our Federal 
Constitution . . . that the three branches of government must be separate 
and independent of one another.  But, what will be the instruments of 
justice?  The court structure; their jurisdiction; the number of judges; the 
sizes of the court houses; the selection of judges; the nature and number of 
Judicial Department personnel—the responsibility for all these decisions is 
reposed by our Constitution and the peoples’ elected representatives—the 
Governor and the General Assembly.  This is as it should be, for like the 
other two branches of Government, the Judicial branch exists solely to 
serve the people . . . . By its very nature . . . it is to a far greater degree 
than the other two branches, cloaked in an aura of majesty and mystery to 
the average citizen’s eye.  Yet, the Judicial branch exists but to serve the 
needs of the people and to that end it is incumbunt [sic] upon the peoples’ 
elected representatives to periodically examine the machinery of justice to 
determine if the people are being served as effectively, as efficiently, as 
intelligently and compassionately as they have a right to expect of their 
Judicial branch.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Unlike most state courts, Connecticut courts did not have a formalized 
evidence code until 2000.  With the advent of the Connecticut Evidence 
Code (the “Evidence Code” or the “Code”), it was thought that all 
Connecticut courts were bound by these rules, allowing common law 
changes only when the Code was ambiguous or silent on a particular issue.  
In 2008, however, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that Connecticut 
appellate courts were not intended to be bound by the Code.  The court 
interpreted the Evidence Code’s stated purpose—“to promote the growth 
and development of [evidence law] through interpretation of the Code and 
through judicial rule making”—as ambiguous, and so turned to the Code’s 
                                                                                                                          
* Saint Michael’s College, B.A. 2003; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 
2010.  I would like to thank Professor Richard Kay for his thoughtful comments and guidance 
throughout the writing process.  I also wish to thank my colleagues at Connecticut Law Review for their 
hard work and insight.  This Note is dedicated to my mother, Susan Wasstrom, whose endless support, 
encouragement, and pursuit of justice led me to the study of law. 
1 Connecticut Commission to Study and Draft Legislation for the Reorganization and Unification 
of the Courts: Hearing Before the Commission to Study the Reorganization and Unification of the 
Courts 100–01 (1973) (statement of Peter Cashman, Lieutenant Governor, Connecticut). 
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history to reach their decision.2  This history persuaded the court that the 
Evidence Code did not divest the appellate courts of the common law 
power to make evidence rules.  The court went on to conclude that such an 
interpretation was necessary to avoid any constitutional impediments. 
Part II of this Note examines the history of the Connecticut Evidence 
Code—the drafting process, promulgation, and initial judicial dicta on its 
binding quality.  Part III provides a detailed statement of the reasoning of 
the plurality opinion in State v. DeJesus,3 as well as the two concurring 
opinions and the sole dissenting opinion.  Part IV focuses on the 
constitutional questions raised in the various opinions—specifically, the 
proposition that the essential functions of the constitutional courts were 
frozen in 1818.  Finally, Part V discusses the effects of DeJesus and 
possible legislative responses. 
II.  HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT’S CODE OF EVIDENCE 
A.  The Drafting and Approval of a Code of Evidence 
In 1999, the judges of the Connecticut Superior Court adopted a formal 
evidence code to be effective in 2000.4  Prior to the Code’s adoption, 
practitioners, judges, and parties relied on the common law, statutes, and 
an informal non-authoritative handbook to determine the rules of evidence.  
“The rationale for having a Code of Evidence [was] that it [would] be 
easier and more efficient for all of the relevant actors in the litigation 
process . . . to have a code, stated in concise and familiar ‘black letter’ 
form, to which to refer.”5 
In her 1984 biennial report, Connecticut Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Ellen Peters suggested that the General Assembly draft and enact a formal 
code of evidence.6  Seven years later, the co-chair of the legislative 
Judiciary Committee initiated the code drafting process by asking the Law 
Revision Commission to research and draft a code of evidence.7  A 
committee, consisting of attorneys, judges, and legislators, met monthly for 
four years to draft the Code.8 
                                                                                                                          
2 State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 62 (Conn. 2008) (quoting CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-2 (2008)). 
3 953 A.2d 45 (Conn. 2008). 
4 CONN. CODE EVID. foreword (2008). 
5 Justice David M. Borden, The New Code of Evidence: A (Very) Brief Introduction and 
Overview, 73 CONN. B.J. 210, 212 (1999). 
6 COLIN C. TAIT & ELIOT D. PRESCOTT, TAIT’S HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE 6 (4th 
ed. 2008).  After the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975, several states followed and 
adopted their own procedural codes similar in form.  By 2000, when Connecticut adopted its first 
evidence code, forty-one states had adopted rules of evidence “patterned on the Federal Rules.”  JACK 
B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 6 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-1 (Joseph M. 
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
7 TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 6. 
8 The initial committee of the Law Revision Commission consisted of the following members: 
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The committee codified the existing evidence law rather than 
reforming it.9  In the few instances where Connecticut common law was 
silent, prevailing nationwide evidence law was used to fill the gaps.10  
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence were loosely consistent with 
Connecticut common law, the committee decided against the wholesale 
adoption of the federal rules because the number of Connecticut lawyers 
practicing in federal courts did not justify “requir[ing] the bench and bar to 
learn a whole new evidentiary vocabulary.”11 
The committee also chose not to incorporate the many evidence rules 
from the Connecticut General Statutes into the Code.12  These statutes were 
deemed “incomplete” and “inconsistent,” thus requiring substantive reform 
beyond the scope of the initial rules promulgation.13  Also, “the committee 
had no confidence that it could find all such statutes and to purport that it 
had done so would be inaccurate and misleading.”14  Later, the Code’s 
drafting was transferred from the legislature to the judiciary, making this 
consideration irrelevant, as the courts cannot change statutes.15 
The committee submitted the draft for public hearing, revisions were 
made, and the final draft of the Code and commentary was sent to the Law 
Revision Commission.  The Commission adopted the Code, without 
further revisions, and sent it to the General Assembly for final approval in 
1997.16  The draft, however, never reached the floor of the General 
Assembly.  Instead, on March 3, 1998, the co-chairs of the Judiciary 
Committee sent a letter to then Chief Justice Callahan requesting that the 
judicial branch, not the legislature, publish the Code as rules of court, 
                                                                                                                          
Professor Chair: Connecticut Supreme Court Justice David M. Borden; Professor Colin C. Tait, 
University of Connecticut School of Law; Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Joette Katz; Connecticut 
Superior Court Judges Julia L. Aurigemma, Samuel Freed, and Joseph Q. Koletsky; Attorneys Robert 
Adelman, Jeffrey Apuzzo, Joseph Bruckman, William Dow III, David Elliot, Susann E. Gill, Donald 
Holtman, Houston Lowry, Jane Scholl, and Eric Wiechmann; Attorney Rick Taff, Legislative 
Commissioner’s Office; Representative Arthur O’Neill and Judge Elliot Solomon, Law Revision 
Commission; Senator Thomas Upson; and Attorneys Jon FitzGerald, Eric Levine, and Jo Roberts, Law 
Revision Commission.  Borden, supra note 5, at 210–11. 
9 TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 7. 
10 Borden, supra note 5, at 213–14.  For example, there existed no rule at Connecticut common 
law resolving the issue of whether preliminary factual determinations regarding the admissibility of 
evidence are subject to the rules of evidence.  The Commission turned to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, and other learned evidence sources to find and apply the 
“generally . . . prevailing view.”  CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-1 cmt., at 2 (2008). 
11 Borden, supra note 5, at 214. 
12 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-180 (2009) (stating the rules for the admissibility of business 
records); Id. § 52-146b (2009) (explaining that communications to clergymen are privileged and cannot 
be disclosed in civil or criminal cases); Id. § 52-180a (2009) (stating the rules for the admissibility of 
out of state hospital records); Id. § 52-184a (2009) (stating the rules for the inadmissibility of evidence 
obtained by electronic device). 
13 TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 7. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 7–8. 
16Id. at 8. 
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similar to the rules of practice.17  The co-chairs proposed that the Code be 
adopted pursuant to the rulemaking authority of the judiciary.  The letter 
explained that judicial control was best, as it would isolate the Code from 
politically-motivated rule changes, be “responsive to judicial concerns,” 
and simplify the amendment process by removing the more time-
consuming restraints of the legislative process.18 
Following this request, Chief Justice Callahan appointed a committee 
to draft and publish a judicial code of evidence.19  This committee made 
minor changes to the legislative committee’s draft and the Code was sent 
to the Rules Committee of the Connecticut Superior Court where it was 
unanimously approved.  A public hearing was held, followed by a vote of 
the Connecticut Superior Court judges, who unanimously approved the 
Code on June 28, 1999, to be effective January 1, 2000.  The judges of the 
superior court formally adopted the commentary to the Code as well.  The 
case law cited in the commentary clarifies the meaning of the rules; 
consequently, the Code cannot be understood properly without the 
commentary.20 
B.  State v. Sawyer: The Code in Question—Final and Binding? 
In State v. Sawyer, the defendant was charged and found guilty in the 
superior court on all counts of sexual assault.21  The State submitted 
evidence of the defendant’s past uncharged sexual misconduct and argued 
that the evidence was admissible under the common plan or scheme and 
identity exceptions to the character evidence bar22 in section 4-5 of the 
Evidence Code which reads: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is 
inadmissible to prove the bad character or criminal 
tendencies of that person. . . . Evidence of other crimes, 
                                                                                                                          
17 Id. at 8; Borden, supra note 5, at 211. 
18 See TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 8–9 (“We . . . believe that the code would more 
appropriately be promulgated as rules of court rather than as legislation of the Connecticut General 
Assembly.  The code reflects existing court-made law and must, in the future, remain responsive to 
judicial concerns.  We are, therefore, submitting the proposed code for consideration and possible 
adoption by the Judicial Department.”); Borden, supra note 5, at 211. 
19 The committee consisted of Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Joette Katz (Chair); 
Connecticut Appellate Judge Barry R. Schaller; Connecticut Superior Court Judges Thomas A. Bishop, 
Thomas J. Corradino, Samuel Freed, John Kavanewsky, Jr., Joseph Koletsky, and William B. Rush; 
Professor Colin C. Tait; and Attorney Eric Levine.  See TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 9–10; 
Borden, supra note 5, at 211. 
20 Borden, supra note 5, at 211–13. 
21 State v. Sawyer, 904 A.2d 101, 104 (Conn. 2006), overruled by State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 
68 (Conn. 2008).  In Sawyer, the defendant was charged with violating Connecticut General Statutes 
sections 53a-70(a)(1) (sexual assault in the first degree); 53a-72(a)(1)(A)–(B) (sexual assault in the 
third degree); 52a-62(a)(1) (threatening); 53a-63(a) (reckless endangerment); and 53a-101(a)(1) 
(burglary in the first degree).  Id. at 105. 
22 Id. at 106. 
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wrongs or acts of a person is admissible for purposes other 
than those specified in subsection (a), such as to prove intent, 
identity, malice, motive, common plan or scheme, absence of 
mistake or accident, knowledge, a system of criminal 
activity, or an element of the crime, or to corroborate crucial 
prosecution testimony.23 
Over the defendant’s objection, the trial court allowed the evidence.  It 
found the exception applicable in light of the similarly situated victims.24  
The appellate court affirmed,25 but the Connecticut Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the similarities between the cases were insufficient 
to show identity because they did not adequately demonstrate a signature 
crime.26 
Most relevant to this Note is the first footnote of Sawyer, which 
precedes even the opening sentence of the decision.  Following oral 
argument, the supreme court requested supplemental briefings and 
arguments from the parties on two issues: first, whether the court should 
liberalize the standard for admitting prior evidence of sexual misconduct; 
and second, whether the supreme court would be allowed to do so under 
the Evidence Code.27  Writing for the majority, Justice Zarella asserted that 
the first issue should not be decided on the basis of ripeness as the facts 
presented did not warrant a change to the admissibility standard.28  The 
majority did not stop there, but went on to comment that while the superior 
court judges, through their rulemaking function, were the proper body to 
change the rules of evidence, the supreme court had a historic common law 
power to resolve substantive evidentiary questions.  Specifically, Justice 
Zarella asserted: 
To the extent that our evidentiary rules may be deemed to 
implicate substantive rights, we believe that it is unclear 
whether those rules properly are the subject of judicial rule 
making rather than the subject of common-law adjudication.  
Because that question raises an issue on which we did not 
request briefing by the parties, however, we leave it for 
                                                                                                                          
23 CONN. CODE EVID. § 4-5(a)–(b) (2008). 
24 Sawyer, 904 A.2d at 106. 
25 Id. at 109. 
26 Id. at 111, 113. 
27 See id. at 104 n.1 (“(1) ‘Should this court determine that, in sexual assault cases, prior 
misconduct evidence admitted under the common scheme exception is also admissible to prove the 
identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the assault on the victim?’  (2) ‘Should this court 
reconsider its holdings that, in sexual assault cases, prior sexual misconduct is viewed more liberally 
than other types of prior misconduct?’  (3) ‘To what extent, if any, is this court constrained by the Code 
of Evidence from answering either question 1 or 2 by changing our existing law?’” (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted)). 
28 Id. at 104. 
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another day.29 
This statement opened the door for what was later to come in State v. 
DeJesus.30 
In her concurring opinion, Justice Katz strongly objected to delaying 
the response to the second issue—what constraint, if any, does the 
Evidence Code exert upon the supreme court?  Justice Katz concluded that 
the supreme court is constrained by the Code and therefore cannot change 
the rules of evidence through common law adjudication.31  In her words, 
“The Code governs where it speaks, and the courts’ common-law rule-
making authority [only] governs either where the Code does not speak or 
where the Code requires interpretation.”32 
Justice Katz, in contrast to Justice Zarella, asserted that the evidence 
rules in the Code are procedural.33  She agreed that, where a rule of 
evidence is constitutionally challenged and substantive rights are at issue, 
the supreme court retains its authority to review the rule for 
constitutionality, just as in cases involving statutes or Practice Book 
rules.34 
Justice Borden, concurring in part and dissenting in part, also asserted 
that the supreme court was constrained by the Evidence Code.  Justice 
Borden concluded that the supreme court is limited to applying the black 
letter law of the Code and interpreting the Code when it is ambiguous.35  
To support this position, he cited the language of the Code itself.  Section 
1-2(a) of the Code states: 
The purposes of the Code are to adopt Connecticut case law 
regarding rules of evidence as rules of court and to promote 
the growth and development of the law of evidence through 
interpretation of the Code and through judicial rule making to 
the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings 
justly determined.36 
Justice Borden also cited the commentary to the Code, which as previously 
noted, must be read in conjunction with the Code.  The commentary to 
                                                                                                                          
29 Id. 
30 953 A.2d 45, 68–69 (Conn. 2008); see also infra Part III. 
31 Sawyer, 904 A.2d at 120 (Katz, J., concurring). 
32 Id. at 121. 
33 Id.  In reaching this conclusion, Justice Katz cited two Connecticut appellate decisions that 
have made this assertion verbatim.  State v. Almeda, 560 A.2d 389, 395 (Conn. 1989); Kelehear v. 
Larcon, Inc., 577 A.2d 746, 749 (Conn. App. 1990). 
34 Sawyer, 904 A.2d at 120–21 n.3 (Katz, J., concurring).  Justice Katz emphasized that “the Code 
is essentially an extension of the Practice Book,” because like the Practice Book, the Code makes the 
law uniform and accessible, by providing a compilation of procedural rules that must be reviewed and 
approved by the rules committee of the superior court.  Id. at 122. 
35 Id. at 124 (Borden, J., dissenting and concurring). 
36 CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-2(a) (2008). 
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section 1-2(a) reads: 
Case-by-case adjudication is integral to the growth and 
development of evidentiary law and, thus, future definition of 
the Code will be effected primarily through interpretation of 
the Code and through judicial rule making. . . .  Because the 
Code was intended to maintain the status quo, i.e., preserve 
the common-law rules of evidence as they existed prior to 
adoption of the Code, its adoption is not intended to modify 
any prior common-law interpretation of the rules.37 
Justice Borden concluded that, when read together, this language limits 
Code revisions to the judicial rulemaking process—the Evidence Code 
oversight committee drafts rule changes and the superior court judges, as a 
whole, approves such changes.  The role of the appellate courts is thus 
limited; interpretation is only permissible when the Code is silent or 
unclear.38  Justice Borden also cited other evidence to emphasize that when 
the Code was adopted, the judges of the superior court intended to 
establish a Code that would not be subject to common law changes.  
Therefore, both the language and intent of the Code bar the appellate 
courts from changing the rules of evidence unless substantive 
constitutional rights are violated.39 
III.  STATE V. DEJESUS:  THE SUPREME COURT TRUMPS THE CODE 
In State v. DeJesus, the Connecticut Supreme Court answered the 
question left open in Sawyer, holding that the supreme court is not 
constrained by the Code, but is free to change the rules therein.40  As in 
Sawyer, the case presented the question of whether the court should change 
the Code by expanding the exceptions to the admissibility of character 
evidence.41  The court obliged, making a new rule allowing character 
evidence when used to prove the defendant’s propensity for aberrant and 
compulsive sexual behavior.  Under such an exception, evidence of past 
uncharged sexual misconduct is admissible if substantially similar to the 
facts on trial.42  In DeJesus, the evidence in question was the testimony of 
a woman claiming to have been sexually assaulted by the defendant.  Like 
                                                                                                                          
37 Id. § 1-2(a) cmt. (a) (emphasis added). 
38 See Sawyer, 904 A.2d at 125–27 (Borden, J., dissenting and concurring) (“[T]he Code provides 
the courts with our full panoply of traditional powers in interpreting the Code and our full common-law 
powers in fashioning new rules of evidence for instances that are not covered by the Code either 
explicitly or implicitly.”). 
39 See id. at 124–26 (Borden, J., dissenting and concurring). 
40 953 A.2d 45, 59 (Conn. 2008). 
41 Id. at 48–49. “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is inadmissible to prove the 
bad character or criminal tendencies of that person.”  CONN. CODE EVID. § 4-5(a). 
42 See DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 59–60 (adopting an exception to the prohibition of admitting bad 
character evidence in sexual crime cases when such evidence demonstrates a common scheme or plan). 
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the victim, she had a learning disability and worked at the same store 
where the defendant was her manager.43  For policy reasons, the Court 
adopted this exception to the propensity rule, though it is not found in the 
Code.44 
A.  Plurality Opinion 
Chief Justice Rogers, joined by Justices Norcott and Vertefeuille, 
advanced two reasons to justify the court’s common law departure from 
the rules in the Code.  First, the purpose of creating the Code was to 
provide a “restatement,” not a binding Code.45  By setting forth black letter 
law, a “restatement” guides the development of a specific area of law, but 
is not binding on the courts.46  In contrast, a “code” is a binding and 
“complete system of positive law, carefully arranged and officially 
promulgated; a systematic collection or revision of laws, rules, or 
regulations.”47 
Second, the plurality’s conclusion—that the Code was not intended to 
bind the appellate courts—was strongly influenced by its doubts about the 
constitutional power of the superior court to bind, with its rules, the 
common law authority of the appellate courts.48  While this constitutional 
issue is the driving force behind the plurality opinion, the holding itself is 
not constitutional, but is instead grounded in the laws of statutory 
construction.  When a statute’s meaning is plain and unambiguous, courts 
cannot interpret or construe that statute.49  However, when “a literal 
reading places a statute in constitutional jeopardy . . . [courts] are bound to 
assume that the legislature intended . . . to achieve its purpose in a manner 
which is both effective and constitutional.”50  Accordingly, courts may 
apply a judicial gloss and liberally interpret otherwise plain and 
unambiguous but constitutionally suspect statutes.51  Following this tenet 
of statutory construction, the plurality in DeJesus broadly interpreted the 
plain language and intent of the drafters to alter but maintain the Evidence 
Code, and only addressed the constitutional question in dicta.52 
                                                                                                                          
43 Id. at 50–51. 
44 See id. at 76 (supplying two policy based arguments: first, that sex crimes are committed in 
private locations where neutral witnesses are not likely to be present; and second, because sex crimes 
are “of the unusually aberrant and pathological nature . . . [so past acts] are deemed to be highly 
probative because they tend to establish a necessary motive or explanation for an otherwise 
inexplicably horrible crime”). 
45 Id. at 68. 
46 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (9th ed. 2009). 
47 Id. at 292. 
48 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 68–69. 
49 State v. Peters, 946 A.2d 1231, 1234–35 (Conn. 2008). 
50 Moscone v. Manson, 440 A.2d 848, 851 (Conn. 1981). 
51 State v. Floyd, 584 A.2d 1157, 1160 (Conn. 1991). 
52 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 68–69. 
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The plurality began its analysis with an interpretation of section 1-2(a), 
which reads, “The purposes of the Code are to adopt Connecticut case law 
regarding rules of evidence as rules of court and to promote the growth and 
development of the law of evidence through interpretation of the Code and 
through judicial rule making . . . .”53  Here, the court found that this 
language, when read together with the commentary, was ambiguous.  
Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice Rogers argued that the term 
“interpretation” as used in section 1-2(a), could have been intended to limit 
“courts to explaining and construing the code in a manner similar to that in 
which they explain and construe statutes enacted by the legislature.”54  
This section of the Code, however, also states that its purpose is “to 
promote the growth and development of the law of evidence through 
interpretation of the Code and through judicial rule making.”55  The word 
“interpretation” when read together with the language “to promote the 
growth and development of the law of evidence,” indicates that the 
traditional common law adjudicative method still could apply. 
To support this claim, Chief Justice Rogers pointed to the commentary 
to section 1-2(a), which states, “Case-by-case adjudication is integral to the 
growth and development of evidentiary law and, thus, future definition of 
the Code will be effected primarily through interpretation of the Code and 
through judicial rule making.”56  Such a reference, she argued, was 
included to allow for an expansive process of “interpretation.”  Chief 
Justice Rogers also asserted that “judicial rule making,” in this context, 
could include both changes made by the Code oversight committee, and 
changes via common law rule making.57  Because of this ambiguity, the 
court found that a plain language interpretation could not resolve the 
question of whether appellate courts are confined by the Code.  Therefore, 
the plurality turned to the history of the Code.58 
From this history, the court concluded that the Code was created to 
establish a restatement for the convenience and ease of practitioners and 
judges; not to divest the supreme court of its common law authority to 
create rules of evidence.59  The court emphasized that the Code’s history 
did not include any discussion of divesting the supreme court of its 
common law authority over evidence, citing the transcript from the annual 
meeting of the judges of the superior court where the Code was adopted.  
Such a large change to over two hundred years of evidence law would 
likely have been discussed.  As Chief Justice Rogers stated: 
                                                                                                                          
53 CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-2(a) (2008). 
54 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 62. 
55 CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-2(a). 
56 Id. § 1-2(a) cmt. (a). 
57 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 63. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 66. 
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[D]ivesting this court of its inherent common-law and 
constitutional adjudicative authority over evidentiary law, an 
authority which this court has enjoyed since its inception, is 
not a minor or picayune detail.  One would assume that, at a 
minimum such a sweeping consequence would merit a brief 
mention in Justice Borden’s summation concerning the 
purpose and impact of the code.60 
The plurality went on to state that this conclusion was consistent with 
the court’s responsibility to “interpret statutes in a manner that avoids 
placing them in constitutional jeopardy.”61  The plurality explained that 
interpreting the Code as divesting the supreme court of its evidentiary 
powers could violate article V, section 1 of the Connecticut Constitution, 
which reads, “The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme 
court, a superior court, and such lower courts as the general assembly shall, 
from time to time, ordain and establish.  The powers and jurisdiction of 
these courts shall be defined by law.”62 
The plurality noted that many state constitutions specifically 
enumerate the roles and responsibilities of the various courts.63  Article V, 
section 1, on the other hand, merely reads, “The powers and jurisdiction of 
these courts shall be defined by law.”64  The plurality asserted that the 
reason for this difference is “obvious.”65  When Connecticut formally 
adopted its constitution in 1818, it did so with the intention of freezing the 
jurisdiction of the court system as it was in 1818—with a “‘Supreme Court 
as the state’s highest court of appellate jurisdiction and . . . the Superior 
Court as the trial court of general jurisdiction.’”66 
The court explained that, at the time of the Connecticut Constitution’s 
inception, there was a supreme and superior court, each with its own 
powers.  The superior court was a court of general jurisdiction with 
authority over the trial of causes, while the supreme court only had 
authority over the correction of errors in law.  According to the plurality, 
when the constitution was enacted, these powers froze, and were insulated 
from any changes short of a constitutional amendment.67 
The court went on to examine evidence law from this era and 
determined that, at the time of enactment, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
had final authority over the rules of evidence.  The court explained that 
historically, beginning with English common law and moving forward to 
                                                                                                                          
60 Id. at 67 n.20. 
61 Id. at 68. 
62 CONN. CONST. art. V, § 1. 
63 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 69. 
64 CONN. CONST. art. V, §1. 
65 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 69. 
66 Id. (quoting Szarwak v. Warden, 355 A.2d 49, 59 (Conn. 1974)). 
67 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 69–70. 
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colonial common law, “the ultimate authority over the rules and standards 
governing the admissibility of evidence rested with the highest court of the 
state.”68 
Having interpreted article V as making such pre-constitutional, judicial 
powers permanent, the court reasoned that denying the supreme court the 
authority to make evidence rules would violate the state constitution.69  
The plurality contrasted the history of evidence rule making to that of the 
rules of practice.  Prior to the Connecticut Constitution, the rules of 
practice, unlike the rules of evidence, were exclusively in the hands of the 
superior court judges who adopted the regulae generales, or general rules 
of pleading, practice, and procedure.70 
According to the plurality, this pre-constitutional superior court 
function justified the exclusive control the superior court exercises over the 
rules of practice.71  Making such a distinction was necessary to complete 
the frozen jurisdiction argument.  Prior to DeJesus, the superior court 
judges exercised “unquestioned rule-making authority in matters of 
procedure.”72  Had the plurality held otherwise, concluding that the rules of 
practice are not binding on the supreme court, they would have gone 
against over two hundred years of precedent. 
B.  Justice Palmer Concurrence 
In his concurrence, Justice Palmer agreed with the plurality that the 
Code did not revoke the supreme court’s ultimate and traditional common 
law power over changes to the rules of evidence.73  Justice Palmer set out 
two reasons for reaching this conclusion.  Like the plurality, he found that 
because the supreme court had common law authority over evidence law 
making prior to 1818, its function as evidence rule maker was 
constitutionally rooted.  Second, Justice Palmer concluded that to deny the 
supreme court the power to make changes to evidence law would violate 
the court’s “inherent supervisory authority.”74 
This supervisory authority is exercised by the supreme court when it 
lacks constitutional authority to act, but the interests of justice require the 
court to clarify an issue for the lower courts.75  Under this doctrine of 
                                                                                                                          
68 Id. at 70. 
69 Id. at 71. 
70 Id. at 72 (emphasis added). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 90 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
73 Id. at 83 (Palmer, J., concurring). 
74 Id. at 83–84 (Palmer, J., concurring). 
75 Id. at 84 (Palmer, J., concurring).  An example of the invocation of this supervisory authority is 
State v. Coleman, 700 A.2d 14, 20 (Conn. 1997).  In Coleman, the defendant pled guilty and was 
sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.  The defendant, however, had vacated his plea prior to 
sentencing, and, on appeal, was awarded a new trial by jury where he was found guilty and sentenced 
to 110 years in prison.  Id. at 17.  The defendant requested, but was denied, an explanation for the 
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supervisory authority, Justice Palmer rejected the notion that the superior 
court could hold the ultimate authority over the rules of evidence.  To do 
so would trump the supreme court’s inherent power over the administration 
of justice and would “render that role advisory rather than supervisory.”76  
Justice Palmer went on to conclude that this supervisory power even 
permits the supreme court to change the rules in the Practice Book.77 
C.  Justice Zarella Concurrence 
This final concurrence provided the most concise argument for why 
the Code could not take evidentiary rule making away from the supreme 
court.  Unlike the plurality opinion, Justice Zarella saw no need to construe 
the language, history, or intent of the Code writers.  Justice Zarella 
concluded that the supreme court’s authority over the rules of evidence 
“existed at common law and was incorporated into the 1818 constitution” 
and so cannot be taken away.78  In Justice Zarella’s words: 
[T]he majority’s resolution of this question places too much 
emphasis on determining the intent of the Superior Court 
judges, thereby indicating that possession of such an intent 
could be dispositive of our inquiry.  This emphasis, coupled 
with the majority’s repeated reference to this court’s 
“inherent” and “constitutional” authority, creates unnecessary 
ambiguity as to the actual scope of the Superior Court’s 
authority over the law of evidence.79 
With regard to the distinction between rules of evidence and rules of 
practice, Justice Zarella agreed with the majority that the history of these 
two bodies of law indicates that the final authority rested in separate 
courts.  Justice Zarella’s analysis relied on a statute passed in 1808, which 
gave the superior court judges the power to enact rules of practice.80  
                                                                                                                          
sentence increase.  Id. at 20.  The Connecticut Supreme Court invoked its supervisory powers and 
established a new rule that, if during the criminal sentencing phase of a trial, a defendant asked why his 
sentence was increased from that established in the previous trial, the judge must provide justification 
for the increase.  Id.  In reaching this decision, the court held that this was a procedural safeguard, 
which the court had no constitutional or statutory power to impose, but instead was necessary to 
promote transparency, fairness, and integrity of the judicial system.  The court thus invoked its 
supervisory powers to ensure public confidence and a fair sentencing process.  Id. at 23.  The concept 
of supervisory authority is noteworthy and demands further investigation; however, such inquiry is 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
76 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 84 (Palmer, J., concurring). 
77 Id. at 86 (Palmer, J., concurring). 
78 Id. at 88 (Zarella, J., concurring). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 89–90 (Zarella, J., concurring) (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 42, ch. 15, § 2 (1808)).  
Justice Zarella referred to CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 42, ch. 15, § 2 (1808): 
And be it further enacted, [t]hat the judges of the superior court, when 
constituting a supreme court of errors, or met for any purpose, be, and they hereby 
are empowered, to institute such rules of practice for the regulation of the said court 
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However, Justice Zarella pointed out that, at that time, judges of the 
superior court were the same judges who sat on the supreme court.  
Accordingly, it is not clear whether these judges enacted the rules of 
practice as trial judges or as appellate judges.  Because of this ambiguity, 
and because the issue did not need to be resolved under the facts of the 
case at hand, Justice Zarella left it for another day.81 
D.  Justice Katz Dissent 
Justice Katz, who sat on both the Law Revision Commission 
Committee that drafted the Evidence Code and the subsequent Judicial 
Committee that finalized it,82 issued a strong and compelling dissent.  
Justice Katz concluded that the Evidence Code is “the functional 
equivalent of laws,” which cannot be modified by the appellate court.83  
She argued that the superior court is authorized by the Rules Enabling Act, 
Connecticut General Statutes section 51-14 to be the final arbiter of 
evidence rules;84 that the text of the Code made clear that the rules of 
evidence could only be modified by the Evidence Oversight Committee of 
the Superior Court Rules Committee; and lastly, that such formal rule 
making was the most prudent method for procedural evidence rule 
development. 
Justice Katz’s analysis began with the purpose of the Code.  She 
disagreed with the plurality’s assertion that the Code is a mere restatement 
of the rules of evidence, arguing that the various drafting committees 
would not have spent six years creating a restatement that already existed 
and was regularly updated.85  Justice Katz then turned to the language of 
                                                                                                                          
of errors, and of the superior court in the respective circuits, as shall be deemed most 
conducive to the administration of justice. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
81 Id. at 90 (Zarella, J., concurring). 
82 See supra notes 8, 19 and accompanying text. 
83 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 90–91 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
84 Connecticut General Statutes section 51-14 states in pertinent part: 
(a) The judges of the Supreme Court, the judges of the Appellate Court, and the 
judges of the Superior Court shall adopt and promulgate and may from time to time 
modify or repeal rules and forms regulating pleading, practice and procedure in 
judicial proceedings in courts in which they have the constitutional authority to 
make rules, for the purpose of simplifying proceedings in the courts and of 
promoting the speedy and efficient determination of litigation upon its merits.  The 
rules of the Appellate Court shall be as consistent as feasible with the rules of the 
Supreme Court to promote uniformity in the procedure for the taking of appeals and 
may dispense, so far as justice to the parties will permit while affording a fair 
review, with the necessity of printing of records and briefs.  Such rules shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right or the jurisdiction of any of the 
courts. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-14 (2009). 
85 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 94 (Katz, J., dissenting).  Justice Katz explained that the Code was not 
enacted as a handbook on evidence, but a Code, a title which renders it “the functional equivalent of 
legislation.”  Id. (quoting TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 13). 
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the Code itself, specifically section 1-2(a), which states, “The purposes of 
the Code are to adopt Connecticut case law regarding rules of evidence as 
rules of court and to promote the growth and development of the law of 
evidence through interpretation . . . and through judicial rule 
making . . . .”86  Justice Katz described interpretation as the process of 
construing language, not changing the meaning of the text or reading 
something new into the text.87  She contrasted interpretation with judicial 
rule making, which she described as a “legal term of art”88 denoting “the 
exercise of a legislative type function” where law is established not by the 
facts of a single case, but by general rules based on a broad scope of 
considerations.89  From this express language, Justice Katz concluded that 
the role of the appellate courts is limited to these two methods of growth 
and development,90 and that the Code took away the appellate courts’ 
ability to modify evidence rules.91 
To further advance this textual argument, Justice Katz analyzed the 
savings clause in section 1-2(b) of the Code.  The savings clause 
specifically allows courts to make new common law evidence rules where 
the Code does not include a rule for an evidentiary procedure.92  Justice 
Katz asserted that such a clause would be superfluous if the methods of 
growth and development enumerated in the Code included common law 
adjudication.  She also described how the savings clause was modeled on 
the Connecticut Statutory Penal Code Savings Code.  The purpose of 
attaching a savings clause to the penal code was to prevent appellate courts 
from using common law authority to modify the crimes and defenses set 
forth in the Penal Code, further supporting her argument.93  Justice Katz 
went on to illustrate that this interpretation had been adopted in a 2002 
Connecticut Supreme Court decision where the court refused to change an 
evidentiary rule contained within the Code, stating: 
If, as the defendant suggests, we were to read § 4-5(c) as 
permitting introduction of evidence regarding a victim’s 
specific violent acts, we would be interpreting the code in a 
manner that would effectuate a substantive change in the law.  
Because such a result would be contrary to the express 
                                                                                                                          
86 CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-2(a) (2008). 
87 To reach this conclusion, Justice Katz relied in part on Black’s Law Dictionary.  DeJesus, 953 
A.2d at 95, 101 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
88 Id. at 101. 
89 Id. at 95. 
90 Id. at 94. 
91 Id. at 110 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
92 CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-2(b) (2008). 
93 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 96–97 (Katz, J., dissenting).  The relevant language of the Penal Code 
reads, “The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed as precluding any court from recognizing 
other principles of criminal liability or other defenses not inconsistent with such provisions.”  CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 53a-4 (2009). 
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intention of the code’s drafters, we reject it.94 
To further illustrate that growth and development were limited to 
judicial rule making, and did not extend to common law adjudication, 
Justice Katz emphasized that the Evidence Code Oversight Committee was 
charged with making recommendations to the Superior Court Rules 
Committee when changes to the Evidence Code were needed.95 
Finding the Code’s language unambiguous, Justice Katz rejected the 
plurality’s inquiry into the judicial history of the Code.  She concluded, 
however, that even if the history is examined, it supports her argument that 
the Code is binding on the appellate courts.  Justice Katz asserted that the 
superior court judges, experienced in judicial rule making from the 
Practice Book, understood that they were adopting a binding Code, not a 
handbook.  Justice Katz argued that Justice Borden’s failure to specifically 
state that the Code was binding when presenting the Code to the superior 
court judges did not warrant the plurality’s conclusion that the superior 
court judges did not understand that they were divesting the appellate 
courts of their common law adjudicative authority over evidence law.96 
Justice Katz went on to offer what she called “anecdotal evidence” of 
the drafters’ intent that the Code be binding.  For instance, a letter from 
Justice Borden asked the Evidence Code Committee to consider a rule 
allowing the supreme court to modify or change rules contained within the 
Code.97  Katz concluded that in rejecting this rule, the Code’s drafters 
showed their intention to enact a binding code.98  She also cited the 
Handbook on Evidence, written by Colin Tait, who sat on the Code’s 
drafting committee, which reads, “The Code could be ‘interpreted’ through 
judicial opinions, or the Code could be amended through the judicial rule-
making process.  But changes to the Code itself were to be accomplished 
only through judicial rule-making, not judicial decisions.”99  From this 
history, Justice Katz concluded that the drafters intended to establish a 
binding code of evidence, which the appellate courts were required to 
follow except where there was an ambiguous rule,100 a conflict of rules, or 
where the Code was silent.101 
                                                                                                                          
94 State v. Whitford, 799 A.2d 1034, 1051 (Conn. 2002) (emphasis added). 
95 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 97–98 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
96 Id. at 101–03 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
97 Id. at 102, 103 n.14 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
98 In this section of the opinion, Justice Katz did not cite Justice Borden’s specific interpretations 
to which she referred.  She did, however, reference Justice Borden’s Connecticut Bar Journal article 
and his dissenting opinion in State v. Sawyer.  Id. at 99–100, 102 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
99 TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 16–17 (emphasis added); see also DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 100 
n.12 (noting that Professor Colin Tait also interpreted the rules set forth in the Code as binding upon 
the appellate courts). 
100 See DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 108 (Katz, J., dissenting).  The Evidence Code does not include 
evidentiary laws set forth in statutes or in the Practice Book.  TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 7–8. 
101 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 100 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Katz argued that there is no pre-constitutional analogy to justify 
the conclusion that the Connecticut Constitution froze the jurisdiction of 
the constitutional courts over the rules of evidence.  In her words: 
The mere fact that, predating our constitution, this court had 
set forth rules of evidence in the context of an adjudication 
simply demonstrates what is undisputed—that this court has 
authority to do so—it does not answer the question in 
dispute, that is, whether another judicial body can adopt rules 
that this court cannot overrule.102 
Katz compared the Evidence Code to the Practice Book, and concluded 
that they are functionally equivalent.  She noted that the Practice Book has 
withstood several constitutional challenges—all of which pertain to the 
separation of powers doctrine and none of which have suggested “that the 
procedure within the judicial branch itself may be constitutionally 
suspect.”103 
Additionally, Justice Katz argued that the superior court is authorized 
to create a binding code pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.104  This statute 
gives the superior, appellate, or supreme court the authority to make rules 
of pleading, practice, and judicial procedure.105  Justice Katz noted that, 
unlike many state constitutions, the Connecticut Constitution does not 
specifically prescribe that final authority over procedural matters be vested 
in the supreme court.106  In light of this absence, the legislature enacted the 
Rules Enabling Act.  It is under this Act that the superior court finds its 
authority to enact the rules of practice.107 
Justice Katz also rejected the argument advanced by Justice Palmer 
that the supreme court maintains the authority to modify and change any 
rule of evidence under an inherent supervisory authority.  She interpreted 
this supervisory authority as one to be employed only when other 
procedures or rules were unavailable, not to contravene an existing rule or 
procedure.108 
Justice Katz also noted that the superior court judges’ proximity to the 
practical effect of evidence rules makes them best-equipped to make those 
                                                                                                                          
102 Id. at 107 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
103 Id. at 104 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
104 See id. at 107 (Katz, J., dissenting) (“Thus, given . . . the delegation of authority under § 51-14, 
I see nothing to indicate that a constitutional conflict would arise by construing the code, as written, to 
allow the judges of the Superior Court to make rules that bind this court.”). 
105 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-14(a) (2009). 
106 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 106–07 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
107 Id. at 98 (Katz, J., dissenting).  These rules of practice are compiled in the Connecticut Practice 
Book. 
108 See id. at 107–09 (Katz, J., dissenting) (“[The court’s] authority is exercised in the absence of 
a rule, when there are gaps in a rule or to supplement procedures under a rule. . . . [T]his court 
previously has recognized the limits of its inherent supervisory authority when a conflict would arise 
with an existing rule.”). 
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rules.  Lastly, she emphasized the importance of separating the rulemaking 
process from the adversarial process so that the Code would be broader 
than single party interests would dictate.109 
IV.  DISSECTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT110 
While several analyses and criticisms of the DeJesus opinions could be 
discussed, this Note focuses on the constitutional question raised.  The 
plurality in DeJesus argued that the essential functions of the superior and 
supreme courts, as they existed prior to the Connecticut Constitution, were 
frozen with the ratification of the constitution in 1818.  Under the 
plurality’s interpretation, one such essential function is the making of 
procedural evidence law.  To the plurality, this creates a constitutional 
grant of “final and binding authority” over evidence law that cannot be 
taken away short of a constitutional amendment.111 
This Note reaches the opposite conclusion.  It concludes that the 
Connecticut Constitution does not preclude the superior court from having 
the final power to promulgate the rules of evidence.  Making rules of 
evidence is not an essential characteristic of the Connecticut Supreme 
Court.  Consequently, that power was not frozen with the constitution of 
1818, leaving the legislature the constitutional authority to grant the 
superior court the power to codify the rules of evidence.  However, as 
discussed below, decades of debate and uncertainty surround this assertion.  
This Note concludes that a constitutional amendment, defining the 
judiciary’s rulemaking authority, is necessary to resolve this dispute. 
A.  Brief History of Connecticut’s Constitution 
In order to understand this issue, the historical underpinnings of the 
Connecticut Constitution must be laid out.  “A constitution—our own 
especially—is the outgrowth of a people’s history, the result of past 
experience and of existing conditions; and it is impossible to ascertain its 
real meaning without studying the conditions it was framed to meet, and 
                                                                                                                          
109 Id. at 109–10 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
110 This Note does not discuss the plurality’s interpretation of the language or intention of the 
Code’s drafters. 
[T]he power of the Supreme Court to alter the rules set forth in the Code by common 
law adjudication was not discussed in so many words in the Code.  The clear 
inference to be taken from [Connecticut Code of Evidence] §§ 1-2(a) and 1-2(b) . . . 
negates such a power as being inconsistent with those explicit provisions of the 
Code. 
COLIN C. TAIT & ELIOT D. PRESCOTT, TAIT’S HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE 2 (4th ed. Supp. 
2009).  That the plurality did find the language ambiguous, however, indicates that it may not be such a 
“clear inference” that the Code was intended to divest the Connecticut Supreme Court of its rulemaking 
authority.  The merits of such statutory interpretation as well as the supervisory authority argument 
raised by Justice Palmer are beyond the scope of this Note. 
111 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 71. 
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the fundamental principles it was adopted to secure.”112  Unlike most 
states, Connecticut did not ratify a constitution immediately after the 
American Revolution.  When Connecticut did ratify its constitution, 
eighteen states had already done so, leaving only Connecticut and Rhode 
Island without constitutions.113  It has been argued that the Revolution had 
little impact on Connecticut’s system of governance because, even prior to 
the Revolution, Connecticut had been mostly self-governing.  For example, 
when passing statutes, the Connecticut legislature did not need to seek 
approval from the King of England and the legislature did not follow acts 
passed by the British Parliament.114  One of Connecticut’s greatest early 
legal scholars, Zephaniah Swift, described Connecticut’s pre-revolutionary 
relationship with England as a “nominal allegiance to the British crown” 
recognized only for purposes of defense and protection.115  Instead of 
ratifying a constitution, Connecticut continued to operate under the laws 
created by the Royal Charter.116 
The pre-constitutional judicial system in Connecticut consisted of a 
supreme court, a superior court, and inferior courts—the court of common 
pleas, justices of the peace, and the probate courts.117  The superior court 
was established in 1711 and originally consisted of five judges appointed 
by the legislature.118  This was a court of general jurisdiction, with 
appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the three inferior courts and the 
power to issues writs of mandamus to those courts.119  The Connecticut 
Supreme Court was established seventy-three years later in 1784 and 
consisted of twelve judges,120 mostly practicing attorneys.  It sat once a 
year to review decisions of the superior court.  In 1808, there was a 
reorganization of the Connecticut Supreme Court.  Politicians, who 
previously could sit on the supreme court, were no longer permitted, and as 
Connecticut constitutional scholar Wesley Horton describes, this was the 
“start of a truly judicial supreme court.”121  Judicial decisions, however, 
                                                                                                                          
112 Styles v. Tyler, 30 A. 165, 168 (Conn. 1894). 
113 Id. at 168; WESLEY W. HORTON, THE HISTORY OF THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT 29 
(2008). 
114 HORTON, supra note 113, at 10; see HENRY C. ROBINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
CONNECTICUT 1–2 (1897) (describing Connecticut’s unique form of governance:  “Unlike all the other 
colonists, and greatly in advance of them, the Connecticut founders disclosed to history a new vision of 
democracy. . . . [T]hey were democrats of democrats.”). 
115 ZEPHANIA SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 57 (1795). 
116 Jarvis M. Morse, Under the Constitution of 1818: The First Decade, in TERCENTENARY 
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, COMMITTEE ON HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS 3–4 (1933). 
117 See SWIFT, supra note 115, at 58–60. 
118 From 1800–06, the superior court consisted of six judges who sat in panels of three; from 
1806–18, the court was composed of nine judges who also sat in panels of three.  HORTON, supra note 
113, at 14. 
119 See HORTON, supra note 113, at 11; SWIFT, supra note 115, at 60. 
120 The judges were the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, and the Council.  SWIFT, supra note 
115, at 60. 
121 HORTON, supra note 113, at 13. 
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even those of the Connecticut Supreme Court, were not final, as the 
legislature retained plenary authority to review and reverse court 
decisions.122 
Gradually, a movement formed in Connecticut that pushed for the 
adoption of a constitution.123  The constitutional proponents argued that the 
Charter of 1662 granted by King Charles, had not been democratically 
adopted by the people of Connecticut.124  Since Connecticut was no longer 
under the control of the crown, operating under this charter was 
questionable.125  The legislature’s supreme power over all three branches 
of government, with no defined separation of powers and the need for 
separation of church and state also drove the enactment of the 
constitution.126  Additionally, a “major force behind the convening of the 
constitutional convention ‘was the growth of the Jeffersonian party and its 
desire to reform the electoral process and to disestablish the 
Congregational Church.’”127 
The catalyst to the constitutional convention was Lung’s Case of 
1815.128  The defendant, Peter Lung, was sentenced to death by the 
superior court, and his conviction was affirmed by the Connecticut 
Supreme Court.  Lung then petitioned the General Assembly for 
reconsideration of the verdict.  The legislature found the trial was 
procedurally improper, reversed the verdict, and ordered a new trial.129  
This intrusion by the legislative branch into a purely judicial matter 
furthered the momentum toward a constitutional convention. 
Three years later, a constitutional convention was held in Hartford 
from August 26 to September 15, 1818, to draft the constitution.  By 
referendum, the people of Connecticut ratified the state constitution.130 
                                                                                                                          
122 See id. at 29. 
123 Morse, supra note 116, at 1; ROBINSON, supra note 114, at 13. 
124 One of the earliest calls for a constitution came in 1804 at a meeting of Republican delegates 
from ninety-seven Connecticut towns who met and asserted “‘as the unanimous opinion of this meeting 
that the people of this State are at present without a constitution of civil Government.’”  At this meeting 
were five magistrates and justices of the peace who had their commissions revoked thereafter by the 
Governor and legislature for making such an assertion.  ROBINSON, supra note 114, at 13. 
125 As mentioned earlier, another school of thought asserted that Connecticut was unique in that it 
never followed British rule anyway, so the system of governance established prior to the Revolution 
was still in place after the Revolution.  See supra text accompanying notes 112–16. 
126 Connecticut had become a state dominated by Congregationalists.  ROBINSON, supra note 114, 
at 13–14. 
127 Kinsella v. Jaekle, 475 A.2d 243, 250–51 n.12 (Conn. 1984) (quoting Richard S. Kay, The 
Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6 n.27 (1975)). 
128 Lung’s Case, 1 Conn. 428 (1815). 
129 HORTON, supra note 113, at 29; William M. Maltbie, The Unconstitutional Period of 
Connecticut History, 14 CONN. B.J. 22, 32 (1940). 
130 Morse, supra note 116, at 4. 
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B.  Plain Meaning Interpretation of Connecticut Constitution Article V, 
Section 1 as It Relates to the Separation of Powers Within the Judicial 
Branch and Between the Legislature and Judiciary 
“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the 
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that 
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate 
exercise in constitutional interpretation . . . .”131  Beginning with a plain 
meaning interpretation of article II and article V, section 1, it is difficult to 
understand the plurality’s argument that the constitution forever froze the 
supreme court’s power to make rules of evidence.  Instead, the text only 
requires there to be a superior court of general jurisdiction, a supreme court 
of appellate jurisdiction, and three separate branches of government.  The 
text of articles II and V neither defines nor limits the extent to which each 
branch has procedural judicial rulemaking power. 
Article V, section 1 of the 1818 Connecticut Constitution reads, “The 
judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court of Errors, a 
Superior Court, and such inferiour courts as the General Assembly shall, 
from time to time, ordain and establish:  the powers and jurisdiction of 
which courts shall be defined by law.”132  This section of the constitution 
has remained largely unchanged; however, it was amended in the 1965 
constitutional convention—the term “inferiour courts” was replaced by 
“lower courts” and the colon was replaced by a period so that the phrase, 
“the powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall be defined by law,” now 
stands alone.  Lastly, the term “of errors” was removed from the title of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court.  The clause now reads, “The judicial power of 
the state shall be vested in a supreme court, a superior court, and such 
lower courts as the general assembly shall, from time to time, ordain and 
establish.  The powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall be defined by 
law.”133 
This language does specifically name two courts—a supreme court and 
a superior court.  The text does not specify the names of the lower courts, 
but instead uses the term “inferior courts.”  Because of this textual 
distinction, the supreme and superior courts are considered constitutional 
courts while the inferior courts are not.134  The powers of the constitutional 
courts are defined by the constitution itself and such powers cannot be 
changed by the courts or by the legislature short of a constitutional 
amendment.  Inferior courts, however, have no such limitation.  Their 
jurisdiction can be altered if such changes do not significantly erode the 
                                                                                                                          
131 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). 
132 CONN. CONST. art V, § 1 (1818). 
133 CONN. CONST. art V, § 1 (2008); see also Szarwak v. Warden, 355 A.2d 49, 58 (Conn. 1974). 
134 These courts are also described as “lower courts” as a result of the 1965 change made during 
the constitutional convention. 
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jurisdiction granted to the supreme or superior court by the constitution.135 
Certainly there is significance in the fact that the Connecticut 
Constitution specifically named a supreme and superior court.  The 
inclusion of the term “supreme court of errors” indicates that there must be 
an appellate court, while the inclusion of the term “superior court” 
indicates that there must be a court of general jurisdiction.136  This 
interpretation is reinforced by the 1818 Journal of the Proceedings of the 
Constitutional Convention of Connecticut.  The journal includes a motion 
to amend article V, section 1 “by striking out the words ‘of errors, a 
superior court,’ and inserting in lieu thereof these words: ‘which shall 
consist of a chief judge, and not more than four other judges.’”137  Such a 
change would have created one constitutional court—a supreme court, 
without any jurisdictional distinction between it and the superior court.  
The motion was rejected, 138 strengthening the theory that the intention of 
the drafters of article V was to create two distinct constitutional courts. 
It seems to be a great leap, however, to interpret the inclusion of these 
courts’ names as an indication that their powers, in every aspect, were to 
forever remain the same as in 1818.  While the clause does specifically 
state there will be “a supreme court” and “a superior court,”139 the clause 
does not read “the supreme court” or “the superior court.”  Analyzing the 
grammatical choice of the article “a” instead of “the” leads to a conclusion 
contrary to that reached by the DeJesus plurality.  The use of “a 
superior/supreme court” suggests that the functions of these courts were 
not frozen; rather, the framers intended for these courts to grow and 
develop while maintaining their essential characteristics—one court with 
appellate jurisdiction and one with general jurisdiction.  Had the drafters 
instead written “the superior/supreme court,” the frozen jurisdiction 
argument would be more plausible. 
Additionally, the last sentence of article V, section 1, asserting that the 
powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall be defined by law,140 suggests 
that the legislature was granted the power to alter the procedural powers of 
the constitutional courts.141  This clause has been a source of great 
                                                                                                                          
135 See Walkinshaw v. O’Brien, 32 A.2d 547, 554–55 (Conn. 1943). 
136 See WILLIAM BONDY, THE SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS: IN HISTORY, IN 
THEORY AND IN THE CONSTITUTIONS 31 (1998) (stating that where “constitutions confer the judicial 
power upon certain specified courts, this must be understood to embrace the whole judicial power, and 
the legislature cannot in such case pass a statute abolishing any such courts, or vest any portion of such 
power elsewhere”).  General clauses giving courts judicial power does not give them all judicial powers 
but only the power to “determine and protect legal rights.”  Id. at 77. 
137 JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF CONNECTICUT 67 (Hartford, Case, 
Lockwood & Brainard 1873). 
138 Id. 
139 CONN. CONST. art V, § 1. 
140 Id. 
141 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-14(a) (2009). 
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controversy and debate among Connecticut legal scholars.142  The dispute 
is whether this last sentence applies to the inferior courts only or also to the 
two constitutional courts.  In Styles v. Tyler, a prominent case examining 
this issue, the majority concluded that while this last sentence of article V, 
section 1 grants legislative authority to define certain judicial powers and 
procedures, that authority is limited when the “jurisdiction [is] 
substantially described” by the constitution.143  Accordingly, the Styles 
court found that the constitution precludes the legislature from altering an 
essential characteristic of the judiciary.144  From this, the court held that the 
statute in question did not intend to extend the jurisdiction of the supreme 
court to the review of factual findings because such an extension of power 
would violate the constitution.145  In his dissenting opinion, however, 
Justice Baldwin asserted: 
If the ordinary rules of grammar are to be respected, the last 
clause in section 1 of article 5, both as originally punctuated 
and as finally engrossed and adopted, qualifies each member 
of the preceding clause. Its construction must be the same as 
if it read thus:  “The judicial power of the state shall be 
vested in a supreme court of errors, the powers and 
jurisdiction of which shall be defined by law; a superior 
court, the powers and jurisdiction of which shall be defined 
by law; and such inferior courts as the general assembly 
shall, from time to time, ordain and establish, the powers and 
jurisdiction of which shall be defined by law.”146 
Under Justice Baldwin’s interpretation, the legislature reserves the 
authority to make laws governing judicial procedure, and therefore, the 
powers and structure of the courts as they existed in 1818 were not frozen. 
The broadly defined distribution of powers set forth in the Connecticut 
Constitution further supports the argument that the legislature has the 
constitutional power to prescribe procedural judicial functions.  Article II 
reads:  “The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit, 
those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; 
and those which are judicial, to another.”147  Unlike twenty-eight other 
                                                                                                                          
142 See, e.g., Styles v. Tyler, 30 A. 165, 177–78 (Conn. 1894) (Baldwin, J., dissenting); Kay, 
supra note 127, at 7. 
143 Styles, 30 A. at 172. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 173–75. 
146 Id. at 178 (Baldwin, J., dissenting). 
147 CONN. CONST. art. II.  The text of this article has been amended by article XVIII, which in full 
reads: 
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and 
each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative, 
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state constitutions,148 Connecticut’s constitution does not include any 
clause specifically limiting the branches from overlapping.  Also, unlike 
many state constitutions, Connecticut’s constitution does not specifically 
grant rulemaking authority to the courts.149  Since the framers did not 
specifically distinguish the functions of these branches, functions such as 
judicial procedure may overlap.  The extent of this overlap is limited by the 
powers specifically granted to each branch by the constitution.  For 
example, the constitution empowers the Connecticut Supreme Court to be 
the court of appellate jurisdiction, so the legislature is constitutionally 
barred from overturning supreme court decisions as they had done prior to 
the constitution.150 
Nevertheless, in Connecticut, “[s]ome doubt exists as to the 
constitutionality of such statutory rules [governing judicial procedure], 
because of the line of cases culminating in the opinion of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court in State v. Clemente” in 1974.151  The Clemente court held 
that a statute prescribing a rule of discovery was unconstitutional because 
the legislature was involving itself in an exclusively judicial procedural 
matter, thus violating the separation of powers doctrine.152  The Clemente 
court recognized that the separation of powers is not to be “rigidly applied” 
and that the 
great functions of government are not divided in any such 
way that all acts of the nature of the functions of one 
department can never be exercised by another department.  
Such a division is impracticable, and, if carried out, would 
result in the paralysis of government.  Executive, legislative, 
and judicial powers of necessity overlap each other, and 
cover many acts which are in their nature common to more 
                                                                                                                          
to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to 
another.  The legislative department may delegate regulatory authority to the 
executive department; except that any administrative regulation of any agency of the 
executive department may be disapproved by the general assembly or a committee 
thereof in such manner as shall by law be prescribed. 
CONN. CONST. art. XVIII. 
148 John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and 
Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1236–41 (1993). 
149 The South Carolina Constitution, for instance, grants its supreme court the exclusive power to 
make rules governing the administration of all state courts, the rules of practice and procedure and the 
power to regulate attorney conduct.  S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4.  Other state constitutions including such 
provisions include VA. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (stating that the supreme court makes rules of practice and 
procedure but these cannot conflict with any legislative rules); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18 (stating that 
the court of appeals makes rules governing the administration of appellate court practice and procedure, 
but these rules can be modified otherwise by law); W.VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (stating that courts have 
the power to make rules of practice and procedure); and N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) (stating that the 
supreme court has exclusive power over rules of practice and procedure for appellate courts). 
150 See text accompanying notes 126 and 131–38. 
151 TAIT, supra note 6, at 10. 
152 State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 729–31 (Conn. 1974). 
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than one department.153 
The court devised a two-part test for determining whether a statute is 
unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers provision: first the 
statute must involve a judicial subject matter, and second, that subject 
matter must be under the exclusive control of the judiciary.154  Following 
Clemente, all statutes involving procedural rule making considered to be 
exclusively judicial are constitutionally questionable.155 
It is not clear from Clemente whether or not rules of evidence fall in 
this exclusively judicial procedural realm.  In State v. James, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court held that “[u]nlike the practices and principles 
relating to discovery, which were deemed in Clemente to be within the 
exclusive power of the courts, the rules of evidence, including those 
relating to the competency of witnesses, have never in this state been 
regarded as exclusively within the judicial domain.”156  In James, the 
defendant, relying on Clemente, asserted that an evidentiary statute enacted 
by the legislature was unconstitutional on the grounds that the legislature 
violated the separation of powers provision in the constitution.  The court 
disagreed and found that, unlike rules of practice and procedure, the 
legislature and judiciary have historically shared rulemaking authority over 
the rules of evidence and the courts have recognized that legislative 
authority as legitimate.  The court concluded that rules of evidence are not 
exclusively judicial in nature, but instead, the legislature has the 
constitutional power to enact rules of evidence.157  From this holding it 
could follow that if the legislature and judiciary share power over evidence 
rule making, the legislature could have the authority to delegate power 
over such rules exclusively to the superior court.  Since the James court 
asserted that evidentiary rule making is not exclusively judicial, it left open 
the ability of the legislature to grant final and binding authority to the 
superior court over rules of evidence. 
An alternative argument, however, could be made that while the 
legislature reserves the power to enact statutes containing evidence rules, 
the power to vest sole authority over writing those rules to the superior 
court is a Clemente-type procedural matter that falls under the exclusive 
control of the judiciary.  Such uncertainty illustrates the need for judicial 
clarification or a constitutional amendment clearly delineating the 
boundaries between the legislative and judicial powers over judicial 
procedure. 
                                                                                                                          
153 Id. at 728 (quoting In re Application of Clark, 31 A. 522, 527 (Conn. 1894)). 
154 Id. at 729. 
155 For a critical examination of the holding in Clemente, see generally Kay, supra note 127. 
156 State v. James, 560 A.2d 426, 430 (Conn. 1989). 
157 Id. at 431. 
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C.  Historical Interpretation of Article V as It Relates to the Separation of 
Powers Within the Judicial Branch and Between the Legislature and 
Judiciary 
In addition to the textual argument above, the history of the 
Connecticut Constitution illustrates that the framers did not intend to freeze 
the powers of the courts as they existed before 1818 or to create a strict 
separation of powers.  When the constitution was ratified in 1818, the 
supreme court had only existed for thirty-four years in contrast to the 107-
year-old superior court.158  During this brief era, the supreme court had 
been restructured twice, first in 1808 and then in 1818 with the 
constitution.159  It is hard to believe that the framers would intend for a 
system that existed for such a brief amount of time, which was still in a 
state of flux, to be forever frozen.  Instead, it seems that the framers 
anticipated the law’s need for change, growth, and development.  To 
accommodate such change, the powers of the Connecticut Supreme and 
Superior Courts were left largely undefined, establishing only the idea that 
there must always be a court of general jurisdiction and a court of appellate 
jurisdiction. 
The main concern of the framers with regard to the separation of 
powers was to prevent the legislature from making judicial decisions, 
which it had done in Lung’s Case.160  That the framers did not intend for 
the constitution to take away the legislature’s role in determining the 
jurisdiction and procedures of the constitutional courts can be seen in the 
enactment of statutes following ratification of the constitution.  The Public 
Statute Laws of Connecticut, revised and enacted by the General Assembly 
in 1821, just three years after the constitution was ratified, illustrate that 
the legislature retained power over judicial procedure even after the 
branches were constitutionally separated. 161  Therefore, it is unlikely that 
the powers of the pre-constitutional courts were intended to be frozen in 
perpetuity. 
In the preface to these statutes, those charged with redrafting the laws, 
                                                                                                                          
158 HORTON, supra note 113, at 12, 29. 
159 Id. at 13, 30–31. 
160 See Lung’s Case, 1 Conn. 428 (1815); PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
CONNECTICUT, AS REVISED AND ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, tit. 21, § 41 n.1 (1821) 
(“Though the legislature, from time to time, had stripped themselves of their judicial power, by 
delegating it to other tribunals . . . [a]n opinion seems to have been entertained, that, as they were not 
limited in their power, like a judicial tribunal, they could, acting, on more elevated and extended 
principles, do more complete justice, than could be obtained in a court of law, or even in a court of 
equity . . . . Experience demonstrated, that nothing could be more improper or dangerous, than the 
exercise of such an arbitrary discretion, by the legislature.  Accordingly, the constitution has now, in 
conformity to correct principles, divided the powers of government into three distinct departments, and 
confided each of them to a separate magistracy: of course, the legislature cannot interpose in matters of 
a private nature, between parties, without infringing that instrument.”). 
161 PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 160. 
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including Connecticut legal scholar Zephaniah Swift,162 explain that this 
set of statutes was revised and certain statutes repealed or rewritten 
specifically for the purpose of making the laws consistent with the newly 
ratified constitution.163  These statutes were revised at a time when the 
constitution and its purpose were fresh in the minds of these re-drafters and 
thus are good evidence of the constitution’s meaning as understood at the 
time of the drafting. 
Of these statutes, the most important to this Note are title 21, sections 
1–41, “An Act for Constituting and Regulating Courts, and for Appointing 
the Times and Places of Holding the Same.”164  This Act sets forth the 
powers and jurisdiction of both constitutional courts and the inferior 
courts.  The supreme court was given final jurisdiction over all cases 
asserting an error of law or equity.165  The Connecticut Supreme Court was 
also given the power to institute rules of practice for that court and for the 
superior court,166 to assign judges of the Connecticut Supreme Court to 
certain counties,167 to establish rules for when court can be adjourned,168 
and to publish the rationale behind their decisions.169  In these revised 
statutes, the superior court was given general jurisdiction over the trial of 
criminal and civil causes,170 was required to appoint a clerk, could order 
pleadings, and was given the power to adjourn sessions.171 
The legislature’s delineation of the roles, procedures, and jurisdiction 
of these two constitutional courts, combined with the fact that this set of 
statutes was revised specifically to ensure their conformity with the 
constitution, indicate that the constitutional framers did not intend to limit 
the functions of the constitutional courts to those of 1818.  Instead, this 
history suggests that the framers envisioned a more flexible system of 
governance with room for growth and development, under the control of 
the legislature.  It has been argued that these early statutes should not be 
considered when interpreting the constitution because the full import and 
meaning of the separation of powers was not understood until the late 
nineteenth century,172 with judicial decisions such as Styles v. Tyler and 
Appeal of Norwalk Street Railway Co.173  It is argued that these later 
                                                                                                                          
162 The redrafters were Zephaniah Swift, Lemuel Whitman, and Thomas Day.  See id. at x. 
163 Id. at viii. 
164 Id. tit. 21 §§ 1–41. 
165 Id. tit. 21 § 3. 
166 Id. tit. 21 § 5. 
167 Id. tit. 21 § 4. 
168 Id. tit. 21 § 6. 
169 Id. tit. 21 §§ 7–8. 
170 Id. tit. 21 § 9. 
171 Id. tit. 21 §§ 13–15. 
172 See Adams v. Rubinow, 251 A.2d 49, 55 (Conn. 1968) (“In the period from 1818 until the 
decision in Norwalk Street Railway Co.’s Appeal in 1897. . . there was a failure to appreciate the full 
import and application of Article 2.” (internal citation omitted)). 
173 37 A. 1080 (Conn. 1897). 
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judicial decisions “clearly determined that (1) the constitution represented 
a grant of power from the people, in whom all power originally resided, 
and (2) the powers granted to the General Assembly are legislative only 
and those granted to the judiciary are judicial only.”174  This rationale, 
which still stands as good law, is unpersuasive, as it is difficult to argue 
that those involved in the framing of the constitution would not understand 
the meaning of the document they themselves had drafted. 
D.  The Rules Enabling Act 
From the textual and historical interpretation above it can be concluded 
that the legislature is constitutionally granted the power to allocate 
procedural rulemaking authority to the superior court.  Through the Rules 
Enabling Act, Connecticut General Statutes section 51-14, the legislature 
has done just that and vested in the superior court the authority to make 
rules of procedure.175  Assuming an evidence code is procedural in 
nature,176 this statute can be interpreted as granting the superior court the 
power to adopt a binding code of evidence.  Neither the plurality nor 
concurring opinion, however, address this legislative grant of power when 
reaching their decisions in DeJesus. 
The Rules Enabling Act, first enacted in 1957, currently reads in part: 
(a) The judges of the Supreme Court, the judges of the 
Appellate Court, and the judges of the Superior Court shall 
adopt and promulgate and may from time to time modify or 
repeal rules and forms regulating pleading, practice and 
procedure in judicial proceedings in courts in which they 
have the constitutional authority to make rules, for the 
purpose of simplifying proceedings in the courts and of 
promoting the speedy and efficient determination of litigation 
upon its merits. . . . (b) . . . The chief justice shall report any 
such rules to the general assembly for study at the beginning 
of each regular session.177 
Rather than discussing this Act, the plurality, in dicta, crafted an 
argument about a procedural separation of powers within the judicial 
branch.  The plurality asserted that the essential characteristics, powers, 
and jurisdiction of the constitutional courts were forever frozen as they 
existed when the constitution was ratified in 1818.  The plurality concluded 
that evidentiary rule making is one such essential characteristic.  The 
plurality found that the supreme court had the common law authority to 
                                                                                                                          
174 Szarwak v. Warden, 355 A.2d 49, 59 (Conn. 1974); Morse, supra note 116, at 15, 19. 
175 CONN. GEN. STAT. §51-14 (2009). 
176 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
177 CONN. GEN. STAT. §51-14. 
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make rules of evidence at the constitution’s inception, and so concluded 
that it must continue to have such authority in perpetuity.178 
This argument assumes constitutional limits on the interference with or 
invasion into procedural rule making by each constitutional court.  The 
case law cited by the plurality fails to support this proposition because it 
pertains to the separation of powers between the legislature and judiciary 
and to the essential functions of the judicial branch, but not to any 
separation of procedural powers within the judicial branch itself. 
The series cited by the plurality begins with the well-known 1894 case, 
Styles v. Tyler.179  In Styles, Justice Hamersley, writing for the majority, 
held that the supreme court is an appellate court limited to the review of 
errors of law, and so cannot review purely factual errors.  The rationale 
was that by specifically naming two courts within article V, the 
constitution designated the jurisdiction of the courts—“one with a supreme 
jurisdiction of the trial of causes and one with a supreme and final 
jurisdiction in determining in the last resort the principles of law involved 
in the trial of causes.”180  It held that only these essential characteristics of 
the two constitutional courts were frozen upon ratification of the 
constitution. 
Walkinshaw v. O’Brien, the next case in the series cited by the DeJesus 
plurality for the proposition that “‘[t]here can be no doubt that it was the 
intent of the [1818] constitution that [the superior court] should continue, 
with the essential characteristics it had previously possessed,’”181 
considered the constitutionality under article V, section 1 of a legislative 
act establishing a Court of Common Pleas as an inferior court.182  The issue 
was whether the legislature had the constitutional authority to determine 
and extend the jurisdiction of an inferior court, or if in doing so they were 
infringing upon the powers vested in the superior courts by the Connecticut 
Constitution.  The Walkinshaw court asserted that deeming a statute 
unconstitutional is of “very grave concern” and that under the Connecticut 
Constitution the legislature has authority over all state affairs, unless it is 
limited by other provisions of the constitution.183  The court found the 
statute constitutional because while almost altering the essential 
characteristics of the superior court, the change was not significant enough 
                                                                                                                          
178 State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 72 (Conn. 2008). 
179 Id. at 70 (citing Styles v. Tyler, 30 A. 165 (Conn. 1894)). 
180 Styles, 30 A. at 171. 
181 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 69–70 (quoting Walkinshaw v. O’Brien, 32 A.2d 547, 549 (Conn. 
1943)). 
182 Walkinshaw, 32 A.2d at 549.  The legislative act in question established one single court of 
common pleas, whereas previously there existed six courts throughout the state that had exclusive 
jurisdiction over appeals from justices of the peace and municipal courts when those appeals did not by 
law have to go before the superior court. 
183 Id. at 552 (citations omitted). 
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to justify overturning the statute.184 
The final case cited by the plurality to support the frozen jurisdiction 
argument was Szarwak v. Warden.185  In Szarwak, the court found 
unconstitutional a statute that gave the circuit courts jurisdiction over 
crimes punishable by fines of less than $5000 or imprisonment of less than 
five years because this transfer of jurisdiction took away the essential 
characteristics of the superior court.  The court asserted that “[t]he test 
determinative of the constitutionality of a statute granting jurisdiction to a 
lower court is then, one of degree.”186  Finding that the legislature had 
disregarded the mandate in Walkinshaw to stop eroding the jurisdiction of 
the superior court, the court held that this statute went too far and altered 
the essential characteristics of the superior court.187 
None of the cases cited interpret the constitution as freezing all the 
procedural powers of the courts.  In Styles, Justice Hamersley described the 
extent of these “essential characteristics”: 
The description of jurisdiction contained in the constitution 
determines only the essential characteristics of that 
jurisdiction, and does not deal with the procedure by means 
of which the jurisdiction is called into exercise . . . the 
exercise of that jurisdiction may practically be limited or 
extended in consequence of changes of procedure not 
inconsistent with such characteristics.188 
Under the Styles rationale, evidence rule making may rest solely with 
the superior court because this is a “change of procedure, not inconsistent 
with such [essential] characteristics”189 of the supreme court.  By placing 
the Evidence Code in the hands of the superior court, the supreme court 
still has final say on constitutional issues which may arise from the 
Code190—just like the supreme court reviews statutes for constitutionality, 
so does it retain the power to review the Evidence Code for constitutional 
infringements.  Therefore, the Evidence Code can rest with the superior 
court without violating the state constitution because it does not take the 
court’s appellate jurisdiction on constitutional matters, but instead is only 
                                                                                                                          
184 Id.  It is interesting to note that one of the citations used here to support the proposition that the 
essential characteristics previously possessed by the constitutional courts were frozen with the 
constitution is a statute enacted three years after the ratification of the state constitution.  Id. at 549.  It 
seems to run contrary to logic that the DeJesus plurality would not rely on the Rules Enabling Act to 
give the superior court judges the final power over evidence rules, but would rely on a case that uses a 
statute delegating judicial powers to make their argument that the powers of the constitutional courts 
were frozen in 1818. 
185 355 A.2d 49 (Conn. 1974). 
186 Id. at 62. 
187 Id. at 62–65. 
188 Styles v. Tyler, 30 A. 165, 173 (Conn. 1894) (emphasis added). 
189 Id.  
190 For example, a due process challenge or confrontation clause argument. 
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controlling the rulemaking mechanism for the enforcement of that 
substantive law.  Such a procedural change does not alter the essential 
characteristics of the supreme court. 
As observed by Professor Richard Kay in his article about separation 
of powers in Connecticut, Hamersley’s subsequent actions and judicial 
decisions further suggest the limitations of his decision in Styles and 
support the constitutional argument for legislative participation in 
procedural judicial matters.  Hamersley served on committees that drafted 
and recommended court rules and practice acts to the General Assembly.  
In his later judicial decisions, such as in Ockershausen v. New York, New 
Haven & Hartford Railroad, the court held that when rules of court 
conflict with a statute, the statute prevails.191 
Furthermore, neither Walkinshaw nor Szarwak supports the argument 
that making procedural rules of evidence is an essential characteristic of 
the Connecticut Supreme Court.  Instead, these cases stand for the 
proposition that the essential characteristics of the jurisdiction of the 
superior court cannot be impaired by a legislative act apportioning 
excessive jurisdiction to the lower courts because doing so would alter the 
essential character of the superior court.192  “Jurisdiction” is defined by 
Black’s Law Dictionary as “a court’s power to decide a case or issue a 
decree.”193  In DeJesus, the question presented was not about jurisdiction, 
but a procedural matter.  As mentioned earlier, this Note does not assert 
that the supreme court can be divested of its power to hear cases where the 
constitutionality of the rules of evidence contained within the Code is 
questioned.  Such a conclusion would violate the constitution, as an 
essential characteristic of the Connecticut Supreme Court is to hear appeals 
on matters of law.  However, the conclusion in DeJesus, that an essential 
characteristic of the Connecticut Supreme Court is to make procedural 
rules of evidence, cannot be sustained by these two cases because they do 
not discuss procedural characteristics inherent to the constitutional courts. 
The author of the Walkinshaw opinion, Justice William M. Maltbie, 
would not likely have been of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the 
constitutional courts was completely frozen in 1818, or that the legislature 
was not permitted to make procedural rules under the state constitution.  
This can be seen in articles written by Maltbie in the Connecticut Bar 
Journal.  In his article entitled “The Courts and Constitutions of 
Connecticut,” Maltbie described the constitution as containing “broad 
definitions and limitations upon the agencies of government, leaving it 
largely to the Legislature by its own acts to adapt their functions and 
                                                                                                                          
191 Ockershausen v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 42 A. 650, 651 (Conn. 1899); Kay, supra 
note 127, at 15–18. 
192 Szarwak, 355 A.2d at 63; Walkinshaw v. O’Brien, 32 A.2d 547, 553 (Conn. 1943). 
193 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (9th ed. 2009). 
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determine their powers in view of the needs of the particular time.”194  In 
another article, Maltbie asserted that the Connecticut Supreme Court was 
given rulemaking power over the rules of the practice and procedure not by 
the constitution, but by the statutes of 1821.195  If Maltbie thought that 
procedural rule making was an essential characteristic of the judiciary, 
frozen with the ratification of the Connecticut Constitution, he would have 
found such an allocation of power unconstitutional. 
This series of decisions illustrates the dangers of the slippery slope.  
What started in Styles v. Tyler as an interpretation of article V as granting 
general jurisdiction to the superior court over the trial of causes and 
appellate jurisdiction to the supreme court in resolving errors of law or 
errors of mixed fact and law, has culminated in DeJesus’s radical departure 
from the text of the constitution.  The holding in DeJesus, that procedural 
evidentiary rule making is an essential and constitutionally prescribed 
characteristic of the supreme court that cannot be shifted solely to the 
superior court, is not supported by the case law cited by the plurality for 
this proposition.  Such an interpretation extends the powers of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court beyond their constitutional scope. 
Perhaps most interesting about the series of decisions upon which the 
plurality’s constitutional argument rests is that each case cited addresses 
the separation of powers between branches, but no case addressed the 
question of a separation of powers within the judicial branch itself.  As 
Justice Katz said in her dissenting opinion in DeJesus, “This court has 
considered constitutional challenges regarding separation of powers 
concerns via legislative intrusion into the court’s authority to adopt rules of 
practice, without ever suggesting that the procedure within the judicial 
branch itself may be constitutionally suspect.”196 
This Note concludes that, because evidentiary rule making is not an 
essential characteristic of the Connecticut Supreme Court, the 
constitutional issue in DeJesus is not the separation of procedural powers 
within the judicial branch, but the separation of powers between the 
legislative and judicial branch.  As stated above, the text and history of the 
Connecticut Constitution support the assertion that the legislature has the 
authority to allocate rulemaking authority to the superior court under 
Connecticut General Statutes section 51-14, or the Rules Enabling Act, so 
allowing the judges of the superior court to adopt a binding code of 
evidence. 
The case law regarding the separation of powers as related to judicial 
procedural rule making, however, has called into question the 
                                                                                                                          
194 William M. Maltbie, The Courts and Constitutions of Connecticut, 9 CONN. B.J. 269, 278 
(1935). 
195 William M. Maltbie, The Supreme Court of Errors, 26 CONN. B.J. 357, 370 (1952). 
196 State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 104 (Conn. 2008) (Katz, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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constitutionality of this statute.197  In 1976, the Connecticut Legislature 
revised section 51-14, likely as a response to the Clemente holding.198  The 
revised language limited the rulemaking authority of the courts by stating 
that they could only promulgate rules of practice and procedure in “courts 
in which they have the constitutional authority to make rules.”199  
Considering the lack of consensus on the constitutional authority of the 
legislature to allocate procedural rule making, the addition of this language 
neither clarified nor resolved this issue. 
The constitutional questions surrounding the Rules Enabling Act 
remain today.  In February 2009, the House introduced a bill to amend 
subsection (b) of the Rules Enabling Act to read as follows: 
The Chief Justice shall report any rules adopted and 
promulgated, or modified, superseded or suspended, by the 
Justices of the Supreme Court, the Judges of the Appellate 
Court or the Judges of the Superior Court pursuant to the 
provisions of this section to the General Assembly for study 
at the beginning of each regular session.200 
The bill also proposes several changes to various judicial procedural 
                                                                                                                          
197 See State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 730–31 (Conn. 1974) (holding that Connecticut General 
Statutes section 54-86b impaired an essential function of the courts and, therefore, was an 
unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers by the legislature); Adams v. Rubinow, 251 A.2d 
49, 56 (Conn. 1968) (“[T]he General Assembly has no power to make rules of administration, practice 
or procedure which are binding on either of the two constitutional courts and that any attempt on its 
part to exercise such power is dependent for its efficacy, upon the acquiescence of the constitutional 
court involved.”). 
198 The amendment to Connecticut General Statutes section 51-14 was part of a much larger bill 
restructuring the Connecticut courts.  H.B. 5605, 1976 Gen. Assem., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 1976).  The 
Joint Committee on Judicial Modernization, a coalition between the Connecticut Citizens for Judicial 
Modernization and the Connecticut Bar Association was established in 1971—before Clemente—to 
study the state of the judicial system and to draft statutory improvements.  Specifically, the 
Commission focused on the overlapping jurisdiction of the probate courts, the courts of common pleas, 
and the superior court.  FIRST REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL MODERNIZATION, H. 
Reg. Sess., at 2–7 (Conn. 1972).  The bill that followed, “An Act Transferring All Trial Jurisdiction to 
the Superior Court,” exceeded five hundred pages and includes the revision to Connecticut General 
Statutes section 51-14.  H.B. 5605, Feb. Sess. (Conn. 1976).  The legislative history is silent with 
regard to the revision of section 51-14.  The rulemaking authority of the judicial branch is referenced, 
but not discussed in depth.  An Act Transferring All Trial Jurisdiction to the Superior Court: Hearing 
on H.B. 5605 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Reg. Sess. 258 (Conn. 1976) (statement of James 
F. Bingham) (“The rule-making powers will remain in the courts and the judges shall establish by rule 
parts and divisions of the said court as they determine necessary.”); see also CONNECTICUT CITIZENS 
FOR JUDICIAL MODERNIZATION AND CONNECTICUT BAR ASSOCIATION, FIRST REPORT OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL MODERNIZATION 103 (1972) (“The subcommittee is dealing with matters 
which fall primarily within the present existing rule-making power of the courts and which do not 
require legislative change.”). 
199 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-14 (1975); An Act Transferring All Trial Jurisdiction to the Superior 
Court, Pub. Act No. 76-436, 1976 Conn. Acts 1 (Reg. Sess.). 
200 H.B. 6340, 2009 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009).  This language was not included in the 
Substitute House Bill.  Substitute H.B. 6340, 2009 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009).  The statute 
currently reads, “The chief justice shall report any such rules to the general assembly for study at the 
beginning of each regular session.”  CONN. GEN. STAT. §51-14(b) (2009). 
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statutes.  For example, the bill proposes to amend section 51-51k, which 
addresses the role and responsibility of the judicial review council; section 
51-51q, which addresses the reappointment process for judges; section 51-
1b, which addresses the function of the court administrator; section 53a-
39a, regarding the public record when a defendant is sentenced to an 
alternate to incarceration; and section 54-56d, which addresses the 
procedure for determining competency of defendants.201 
At the public hearing for House Bill 6340, Barbara Quinn, the Chief 
Court Administrator, submitted testimony on behalf of the judicial branch.  
In her testimony, Quinn stated that the judicial branch approves of all the 
bills’ contents except for those relating to court rules.  Specifically, Quinn 
stated: 
For the past thirty years, the Judicial Branch has been 
providing copies of all of the rules changes made during the 
preceding year to the General Assembly in order to promote 
cooperation and avoid a constitutional confrontation.  This 
does not mean that the judiciary has acquiesced and ceded its 
authority with regard to the adoption of procedural rules for 
the courts.  During that time, the Judiciary Committee has 
never held a hearing on the rules submitted, as required by 
the statute, nor has the Legislature ever declared a rule to be 
void pursuant to this statute.  If those events were to occur, 
the Judicial Branch might very well raise the issue of this 
statute’s constitutionality.  If you decide that the Legislature 
should have control over the procedural rules, I would submit 
that a constitutional amendment is necessary.202 
Why the judicial branch considers legislative involvement to be 
constitutionally permissible in certain judicial procedural matters, but not 
in others, remains unclear.  Such inconsistency illustrates the need for 
clarity in the law. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEJESUS DECISION 
The four-and-a-half-year effort, intended to provide an authoritative 
statement of Connecticut evidence law, one on which parties, practitioners, 
and judges could rely, has been defeated.  In Tait’s Handbook of 
Connecticut Evidence, Professor Colin Tait wrote: 
Attorneys and judges at trial who rely on the Code may do so 
at their peril.  The net effect of [the DeJesus] holding is that 
                                                                                                                          
201 H.B. 6340, 2009 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009). 
202 Rules Enabling Act: Hearing on H.B. 6340 Before the Judiciary Comm., 2009 Gen. Assem., 
Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2009) (statement of Barbara M. Quinn, Chief Court Adm’r). 
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litigators are free to challenge on appeal any trial court ruling 
relying on the Code of Evidence, even if the ruling is not 
constitutional in nature.203 
Now that these rules can be changed by the appellate courts, they are 
not authoritative or binding.  Since the Code itself will need to be changed 
every time any appellate decision changes a Code provision, the Code will, 
in a sense, always be “out-of-date.”204  Any common law changes will have 
to be drafted, approved, and then added to the Code.  As this is a time-
consuming process, there will inevitably be times when the Code does not 
include all evidence rules, so those in need of assurance that a rule is what 
it purports to be cannot depend on the Code.  Also, parties cannot rely on a 
rule from the Code when arguing on appeal because the appellate courts 
can now change the rules of evidence as they see fit. 
Also troubling about the DeJesus holding is the four-and-a-half-year 
waste of legislative and judicial resources expended to develop the Code.  
The lack of cooperation between the judicial branch and the legislative 
branch caused this and will continue to do so until the debate is resolved.  
For the sake of saving resources, the law must be predictable.  To 
accomplish this, the limits of the legislature’s powers in the judicial 
context need be defined more precisely than the current law provides.  
Judges, legislators, and private parties need to know where constitutional 
authority ends and begins.  In DeJesus, an arguably constitutional 
allocation of power from the Rules Enabling Act authorized the superior 
court to make this an authoritative code, but the supreme court did not 
address this.  The Rules Enabling Act directs the superior, appellate, and 
supreme courts to adopt procedural rules when they have the constitutional 
authority to do so.205  Following DeJesus, that constitutional authority is 
unclear—a binding evidence code is now considered beyond the superior 
court’s constitutional scope, and possibly the rules of practice and 
procedure also. 
This ambiguity has resulted in an unreliable code of evidence and 
countless hours of taxpayer-funded work wasted.  Reconciliation is needed 
between these two branches over who has the power to make rules 
regulating court procedure: the legislature and the courts, or the courts 
alone.  Otherwise, this waste of resources and time will continue, stalling 
progress on more pressing substantive issues. 
Since the Connecticut Legislature is not likely to cede its rulemaking 
power, and the courts do not seem likely to recognize that rulemaking 
authority, a more drastic approach seems necessary.  A constitutional 
                                                                                                                          
203 TAIT & PRESCOTT, supra note 6, at 3. 
204 Id. at 3–4. 
205 CONN. GEN STAT. § 51-14 (2009). 
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amendment may serve as the best means to resolve the difference of 
opinion on the subject.206  Since this debate over procedural authority has 
lasted for several years, the respective branches do not seem likely to 
resolve this issue on their own.  Accordingly, it is time to put the issue to 
rest, and turn it over to the electors to decide.  Currently, there is a pending 
resolution to amend article V.207  The amendment proposes the language be 
changed to read: 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a 
supreme court, an appellate court, a superior court, and such 
lower courts as the general assembly shall, from time to time, 
ordain and establish. The general assembly shall prescribe by 
law the powers, procedures and jurisdiction of these courts.208 
While it is beyond the scope of this Note to analyze the specific language 
of a constitutional amendment, it seems the amendment should not wholly 
exclude the judicial branch from the rulemaking process, as this proposal 
does. 
It has been argued that amending article V is not warranted because the 
procedural rule making dispute does not rise to the level of extraordinary 
circumstances required for amending the constitution.  Both Wesley 
Horton and Justice Zarella made this assertion in their testimony at the 
public hearing on the proposed amendment.  According to Horton, 
“[U]nless there were some enormous crisis going on that you need to 
change the balance of powers—and there’s no crisis out there; there’s no 
major reason for this—you shouldn’t be putting up a constitutional 
amendment.”209  Similarly, Justice Zarella asserted, “In my view, and in 
the view of the branch, amending any constitution is an extraordinary act.  
It should be done only as a last resort.  The constitution should be amended 
when a significant recurring problem has been identified and the only 
solution is a constitutional amendment.”210  While this premise is accurate, 
this Note illustrates that the ongoing conflict between the legislature and 
the judiciary does indeed warrant such an amendment.  This constitutional 
dispute has resulted in wasted time and resources, as illustrated by the 
                                                                                                                          
206 But see Wesley W. Horton & Kenneth J. Bartschi, 2006 Connecticut Appellate Review, 81 
CONN. B.J. 1, 13, 15–16 (2007) (concluding that reconsideration of the Clemente holding is the solution 
to the uncertainty surrounding the separation of powers and judicial procedure). 
207 S.J. Res. 46, 2009 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009). 
208 Id.  The current article V, section 1 reads, “The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a 
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law.”  CONN. CONST. art. V, § 1. 
209 Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the State Concerning the 
Procedures of the Courts: Hearing on S.J. Res. 46 Before the Judiciary Comm., Jan. Sess. 132 (Conn. 
2009) (statement of Wesley Horton, Conn. Bar Association). 
210 Id. at 137–38 (statement of Justice Peter T. Zarella). 
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dismantling of the Evidence Code.  If the issue were resolved, courts and 
legislators could direct their work toward more important law making.  
Furthermore, as stated by Senator McDonald, “I don’t necessarily agree 
that the only time you entertain constitutional amendment questions is 
when there’s an uproar about a particular subject.  You can actually do it in 
a non-volatile situation as well.”211 
In the meantime, the legislature could enact the Evidence Code as a 
statute.  In doing so, the time and resources expended on making the Code 
would not be futile because the legislature could essentially adopt the Code 
as is, adding to it the rule from DeJesus.212  If the legislature does this, it 
should also add other Connecticut statutory evidence laws to the Code.213  
While sorting through the statutes will be a resource-consuming project, it 
would result in an even better product than the initial Code.  The concern 
with this solution is that the Connecticut Supreme Court would find such 
an act unconstitutional based on the holding in DeJesus, again illustrating 
the problems caused by unpredictable law. 
A legislative takeover of the Evidence Code has its disadvantages.  
First, the same concerns that prompted the legislature to relinquish 
authority over the Code to the judiciary in 1998 still exist today.  As 
discussed earlier, these concerns are that the Code should be responsive to 
judicial concerns, isolated from politically motivated changes, and should 
be easier to amend than it would be under legislative restraints.214  Second, 
such a takeover will continue to widen the divide between courts and the 
legislature instead of these two branches working cooperatively to solve 
procedural issues.  Additionally, there is the looming question of whether 
the courts would recognize such a legislative code, or instead deem it 
unconstitutional.  The DeJesus plurality opinion215 and Justice Palmer’s 
concurring opinion216 both quote State v. James for the proposition that the 
legislature has enacted statutes governing evidence procedure which have 
not been found to violate the separation of powers but have instead been 
accepted by the courts.  Additionally, the original intent of the judiciary 
was for the Code to be a legislative compilation, as illustrated by Chief 
Justice Ellen Peters’s 1984 biannual report asking the legislature to codify 
evidence rules.217  There remains the possibility, however, that the courts 
would not find such a legislative code of evidence constitutional.  Since the 
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214 See supra Part II.A. 
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DeJesus court held that control over evidence rule making is a 
constitutionally prescribed function of the appellate courts, the court could 
assert that, just as this function cannot be taken away by the superior court, 
neither can it be taken away by the legislature.  Also, the question of 
whether a judicial rule of evidence trumps a statutory rule has yet to come 
before Connecticut courts.  As the court wrote in James, “We leave to 
another time the question whether our constitutional authority to make 
rules governing court ‘administration, practice or procedure’ extends also 
to the creation of a code of evidence and the resolution of possible 
conflicts between its provisions and legislative enactments affecting the 
same matters.”218 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of condensing Connecticut’s common law evidence rules 
into a code was to increase courtroom efficiency by eliminating the time 
and resources wasted by judges and practitioners trying to decipher 
common law rules.  Unfortunately, the Evidence Code has been reduced to 
an outdated restatement of evidence law, one that cannot be relied upon as 
it does not include this latest common law rule and because the rules it 
does contain can be altered by appellate courts as they please.  The 
Connecticut Supreme Court, unable to agree on one rationale to justify this 
departure from the Code’s purpose, put forth three different ways of 
reaching the same conclusion, illustrating the unstable foundation on which 
this holding stands.  This Note concludes that the constitutional argument 
not only fails, but also sets a dangerous precedent.  To limit the jurisdiction 
of the two constitutional courts to not only their essential functions, but 
also the non-essential functions of their eighteenth and nineteenth century 
predecessors, freezes for eternity a judiciary that was intended to grow and 
develop over time.  This has resulted in a split judiciary that cannot agree 
on an evidence code, the success of which would simplify procedure so 
that courts can focus on substantive issues and not squander their time on 
procedural disputes.  The result of this is a split judiciary that cannot agree 
on something like an evidence code, the success of which would have 
simplified procedure so that courtrooms could focus on substantive issues 
instead of squandering time on procedural disputes. 
                                                                                                                          
218 State v. James, 560 A.2d 426, 431 (Conn. 1989) (quoting Adams v. Rubinow, 251 A.2d 49, 56 
(Conn. 1968)). 
